Landlord-Tenant—Forcible Entry and Detainer - Statutory Prohibition of Landlord Self-Help Remedies by Dale, Reneé Sims
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 4 Article 6 
1986 
Landlord-Tenant—Forcible Entry and Detainer - Statutory 
Prohibition of Landlord Self-Help Remedies 
Reneé Sims Dale 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Reneé Sims Dale, Landlord-Tenant—Forcible Entry and Detainer - Statutory Prohibition of Landlord Self-
Help Remedies, 9 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 683 (1987). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol9/iss4/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
LAN DLORD-TENANT-FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DE-
TAINER-STATUTORY PROHIBITION OF LANDLORD SELF-HELP REME-
DIES. Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 712 S.W.2d 888 (1986).
Johnny and Mary Gorman entered into an agreement in Novem-
ber of 1984 to lease a residence in Jefferson County from Russell Rat-
liff. The Gormans subsequently defaulted by failing to make a rental
payment in April of 1985. Ratliff orally notified the Gormans on sev-
eral occasions that they should vacate. Ratliff prepared written notice
dated April 22, 1985, giving the Gormans three days to vacate;1 how-
ever, during the three day period, Ratliff entered the home while the
Gormans were away and confiscated all of their personal property. Rat-
liff acted pursuant to specific lease provisions that gave him a lien on
the Gormans' personal property in case of default. Ratliff stored these
items, intending to sell them in thirty days to satisfy the lien created by
provisions of the lease.
I. Record at 161, Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 712 S.W.2d 888 (1986) (No. 85-449).
The record indicates that the Gormans never received this written notice, however, they indicated
at trial that notice to vacate was received at some time in early April although it is unclear when
that was. Record at 118. Notice was not at issue in the lawsuit, however, because the lease specifi-
cally provided that notice was not required before the landlord exercised the lien on the personal
property.
2. Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 712 S.W.2d 888 (1986). The lease provided in relevant
part:
10. Any violation of any provision of this lease by any of the lessees, or any person on
the premises with the lessee's consent, or any failure to pay rent upon the date due,
shall result, at the option of the lessor, in the immediate termination of this lease with-
out notice of any kind, and lessor may thereupon enter said premises and take and
retain possession thereof and exclude lessees therefrom.
12. If lessees leave said premises unoccupied at any time while rent is due and unpaid,
lessor may, if desired, take immediate possession thereof and exclude lessee therefrom,
removing and storing at the expense of said lessees all property from contained therein.
14. The lessor shall have the lien granted by law all baggage and other property of
lessees for their rent, accomodation and services, and the lessees hereby grant to lessor
a lien upon all personal property brought into said premises, regardless of any provi-
sions of law or whether or not the apartment is furnished, and lessor may enforce said
lien as provided by law or by removing said property therefrom and storing the same at
the expense of the lessees. Said lien may be enforced whenever rent is due and unpaid
and regardless of whether or not a three (3) day notice to pay rent or quit shall have
been served, and enforcement of the lien shall not operate to waive any other rights of
the lessor in unlawful detainer or otherwise. If rent is still due and unpaid thirty (30)
days after the enforcement of said lien, then the lessor may sell any or all personal
property taken possession of as herein provided, and may apply any monies received
against the unpaid rent . . ..
Id. at 334-35, 712 S.W.2d at 889.
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Central Arkansas Legal Services filed suit on behalf of the
Gormans, initially claiming wrongful and constructive eviction and
wrongful conversion of property. Ratliff counterclaimed, alleging that
the Gormans' violation of the lease entitled him to enforce the lien on
the personal property. The counterclaim alleged that Ratliff was also
entitled to the delinquent rent, as well as moving, storing, and cleaning
charges totalling $528.
The Gormans amended their complaint to allege that Ratliff's ac-
tions constituted forcible entry and detainer, which is prohibited by Ar-
kansas law.3 The Gormans further contended that the lease provisions
authorizing Ratliff's actions were illegal, unconscionable, and in viola-
tion of public policy.
The Circuit Court of Jefferson County denied the Gormans' re-
quest for relief pendente lite in a preliminary hearing. The court ruled
that the lease provisions gave Ratliff the right to peaceful repossession
of the premises and a lien on the Gormans' belongings. Following a
non-jury trial, the court found against the Gormans on every claim.
The court concluded that the lease conformed to applicable Arkansas
law, and awarded Ratliff the damages set out in his counterclaim.
The Gormans appealed, and on appeal the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the provisions of the lease authorizing self-
help remedies contravened the forcible entry and detainer statute and
were invalid. The court remanded the case for a determination of the
Gormans' damages under the damages provision of the forcible entry
and detainer statute.4 Gorman v. Ratliff, 289 Ark. 332, 712 S.W.2d
888 (1986).
The lack of coercive force in the early law of Englandlaccounts for
the presence of most violent kinds of self-help.' The belief that "might
makes right" characterized the law prior to 1166, and the best title to
land was the possession by strong arm.' At a fairly early stage, how-
ever, the law substituted the requirements of resort to the legal process,
and absolutely prohibited the use of force to avenge one's self.9
By the thirteenth century, the English law viewed self-help as "an
3. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1501 to -1512 (Supp. 1985).
4. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1509 (Supp. 1985).
5. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 281 (5th ed. 2d impression 1973).
6. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 574 (2d ed. 1898) (reis-
sued with new introduction, and bibliography 1968).
7. Comment, Defects in the Current Forcible Entry and Detainer Laws of the United States
and England, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1068 (1978).
8. I L. PIKE. A HISTORY OF CRIME IN ENGLAND 249 (1873-76).
9. 4 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 6, at 574.
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enemy of law, a contempt of the king and his court. . . ., " As an
exception to the prohibition of self-help, thirteenth century law recog-
nized the continued usefulness of distraint, the oldest form of self-help
available to the landlord." Distraint was accomplished through the
process of distress, or the taking of a thing. 2 Non-payment of rent was
the most important instance for which a distraint might be used.'" Dis-
traint was freely used in the thirteenth century and was extra-judicial
in the sense that no order was required before goods could be seized."
The right to distraint, however, continued to be judicial in character by
virtue of limiting rules.'6
The Statute of Marlborough (1267) severely regulated unlawful
uses of the practice of distraint.'6 The ultimate effect of the many regu-
lations placed on the practice was to change this method of self-help
into a regular legal process.' 7 In addition, modern decisions in states
continuing to recognize distraint substantially curtail this remedy.18
In Bennett v. Taylor'9 the Arkansas Supreme Court expressly held
10. Id. The emphasis on the protection of the seisin of lands, chattels, incorporeal things,
liberty of serfage, or the marital relationship explains this view. Id. "Seisin" as a term connotes
peaceful possession, although it eventually came to mean something distinct from mere possession.
C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 87 (1962). In the medieval com-
mon law, concepts of ownership and possession merged into the concept of seisin. The term even-
tually came to mean a particular kind of possession: "possession under claim of a freehold estate
therein." Id. at 87-88. The concern with protection of seisin was addressed through the assize of
novel disseisin. Id. at 88-89. Instituted in 1166, this action gave the possessor of land legal protec-
tion. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 583. The disseised party could bring this assize, even in
the thirteenth century, and could obtain a limited right of re-entry within four or five days. Id. at
279, 583. The right to re-enter followed a judgment that the defendant had disseised the plaintiff.
C. MOYNIHAN, supra at 89.
II. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND. supra note 6, at 576-77. According to Blackstone, dis-
traint was "intended for the benefit of landlords" and involved distress, which "is the taking [of] a
personal chattel out of the possession of the wrongdoer . . . to procure a satisfaction for the wrong
committed." 3 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *6.
12. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND. supra note 6, at 575. The thing taken might also be
referred to as a distress. 3 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES *6.
13. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 6 at 576. See also W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 5, at 281.
14. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND. supra note 6, at 576. At some time prior to the thir-
teenth century, the landlord could not distrain until the court gave him that right. Even in the
thirteenth century, rules placed certain items beyond his reach, and failure to follow the rules
made him a disseisor. Id. at 577.
15. Id. at 576. For example, the landlord could not sell or use the distrained items, and he
must be ready to return them upon payment of the delinquent rent. Id.
16. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 282.
17. Id. at 283.
18. See, e.g., Backer, Pennsylvania Landlord Remedies: Collection of Rent and Recovery of
Possession. 89 DICK. L. REV. 53, 77 (1984).
19. 185 Ark. 794, 49 S.W.2d 608 (1932). In the absence of statute or caselaw, two forms of
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that the law of Arkansas does not "recognize[] the harsh and oppres-
sive remedies of the landlord's common-law right of distraint ... .
In In re King Furniture City, Inc.,21 involving a bankruptcy and fore-
closure proceeding, the district court acknowledged and followed the
holding in Bennett.22 The court in In re King v. Furniture City, Inc.
held that a lease provision expressly creating a lien in the landlord over
a tenant's property and expressly waiving the exemption statutes, could
not be upheld as giving the landlord the remedy of distraint.23
Distraint has been retained statutorily in some states.2 4 Statutory
distraint has been characterized as "the sole surviving relic of the early
common law's tolerance of self-help."'2 5 Other states have prohibited
distraint by statute.26 In at least one jurisdiction, the highest court of
the state has held the statutorily prescribed process of distraint
unconstitutional.27
In addition to the self-help remedy of distraint, the common law
recognized the landlord's right to enter the property and regain posses-
sion peaceably. 28 The use of force in defense of self against forcible
distraint would have been authorized under the common law adopted by Arkansas in its reception
statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1-101 (1976). The law prior to the fourth year of the reign of James I
authorized two forms of distraint for rent: (I) rent service (a holding by fealty or homage, as well
as certain rent) and (2) rent charge (a holding under a lease containing a clause reserving a right
to distrain). It was not until the reign of George II that the distinction between the several kinds
of rent was abolished, giving remedy by distress for all rents. See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*41-42.
20. 185 Ark. at 797, 49 S.W.2d at 609 (1932).
21. 240 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
22. Id. at 456 (citing Bennett v. Taylor, 185 Ark. 794, 49 S.W.2d 608 (1932)).
23. 240 F. Supp. at 456.
24. C. MOYNIHAN. supra note 10, 70 n.3. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250-302 (Pur-
don 1984-85); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 33-1 to -23 (West 1952 & Cum. Supp. 1982-83) (the 1971
amendment exempted residential leases from distraint).
25. Callen v. Sherman's, Inc., 92 N.J. 114, 120, 455 A.2d 1102, 1105 (1983).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-25.9(b) (Supp. 1985). North Carolina has prohibited landlord dis-
traint/distress and thereby codified the pre-existing caselaw, which has prohibited it since 1800.
Dalgeish v. Grandy, I N.C. (I Tay.) 213, 215 (1800). North Carolina did give the landlord a
statutory lien on the tenant's goods on the land. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-2(a)(e) (repealed
1967).
27. Callen v. Sherman's, Inc., 92 N.J. 114, 455 A.2d 1102 (1983). The court in Callen inter-
preted the New Jersey statute and held that a statute authorizing padlocking and distraint is an
unconstitutional deprivation of the tenant's right to due process. The statute did not require that
the tenant be given notice or a hearing, before the lessor took possession. Id. at 132-33, 455 A.2d
at I 111. See also Note, Landlord and Tenant-Distraint-New Jersey Distress Act Held Unconsti-
tutional for Failure to Meet Due Process Hearing and Notice Requirements, 13 SETON HALL 845
(1983).
28. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 279. Early cases decided in this country by the
United States Supreme Court held that a landlord's right to re-enter as provided in the lease was
waived by an act of distraint. The Court reasoned that the landlord recognized the continuing
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resistance of the tenant was also justified." Prior to and extending into
the thirteenth century, a disseised party could bring the assize of novel
disseisin, and when land was involved, re-enter within four or five
days.30 This summary process was followed by the forcible entry acts,31
a series of acts passed in England between 1381 and 1623,2 for the
purpose of "prevent[ing] individuals from doing themselves right by
force. . . ." Three of these acts, taken together, comprise the origins
of the forcible entry and detainer statutes adopted in most states in this
country around the early nineteenth century. 3'
In nineteenth century America, lease terms gave the landlord the
right to end possession when the tenant defaulted on rent. 5 The legisla-
tures of the various states passed statutes giving the party entitled to
validity of the lease and the resulting continued relationship of landlord/tenant; therefore, he was
estopped from entering to regain possession. See 49 AM. JUR. 2D Landlord/Tenant § 1066 (1970)
(citing Knickerbocker Life Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U.S. 234 (1877), and Dermott v. Wal-
lach, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 61 (1863).
29. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 279.
30. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5, at 583; and supra note 10 and accompanying text.
31. See 3A G. THOMPSON. COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §
1369 (1981).
32. 18 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 405-06 (3d ed. 1970).
33. See Thorn v. Reed, I Ark. 480, 493 (1839).
34. Id. at 493. The earliest forcible entry act, adopted in England in 1381, made forcible
entry without legal process a misdemeanor. Forcible Entry Act, 1381, 5 Rich. 2, ch. 7, repealed
by Criminal Law Act, 1977, ch. 65 § 13(2). The Act provided:
None from henceforth make any entry into any lands and tenements, but in case where
entry is given by law; and in such case not with strong hand, nor with multitude of
people, but only in [peaceable] and easy manner. And if any man from henceforth do to
the contrary, and thereof be duly convict, he shall be punished by imprisonment.
13 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND, 405 (3d ed. 1970) (reprinting Forcible Entry Act)
(brackets in original, footnote omitted). The terms of this earliest statute did not provide a civil
remedy; however, many civil actions were brought pursuant to it. 13 HALSBURY. supra, at 406.
Later cases established that the rights of the parties were not affected, and therefore damages
were improper. 13 HALSBURY, supra note 5, at 280.
The second most significant of these acts, The Forcible Entry Act of 1429, 8 Hen. 6, ch. 9,
repealed by Criminal Law Act, 1977, ch. 65, § 13(2) (reprinted in 2 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 494 (7th ed. 1882)), provided that the act of holding lands forcibly
after a peaceful entry would likewise be indictable as a detainer. 13 HALSBURY, supra, at 408-09.
The act empowered justices of the peace to restore the injured person to possession. 13 HALSBURY,
supra, at 408-09.
Finally, the Forcible Entry Act of 1589, 31 Elizabeth ch. II, repealed by Criminal Law Act,
1977 ch. 65, § 496 (reprinted in 2 J. BISHOP, supra, § 496), limited the mode of redress by
allowing persons indicted under the Act to allege possession for three years to avoid returning the
lands. 2 J. BISHOP, supra, § 496 at 280. Failure to prove three years possession led to penalty of
costs. Id.
35. 2 H. TIFFANY, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 247(d), (e) at 1764-
65 (1912). See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § I I (West Supp. 1986).
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possession a summary remedy, 6 and in many cases designated this pro-
cess as forcible entry and detainer.3 The statutes of most states provide
only a civil process, although some states retain criminal penalties 8 for
forcible entry onto land. The statutes have been viewed as permitting
varying degrees of landlord self-help. 9
Traditionally, American landlord/tenant law protects the right of
the tenant not to be disturbed in his possession.4 This protection of the
tenant arises from the obligation of the landlord to provide "good title
and a clear right to possession at the commencement of the term."' 1
Dramatic changes during and since the 1960s have extended the obli-
gations of the landlord to his tenant."2 These reforms favor the tenant
in the summary process of forcible entry and detainer.
The first version of the forcible entry and detainer statute adopted
in Arkansas was incorporated by reference in 1819 when the Missouri
Territorial statute of forcible entry and detainer 44 was applied to the
36. 35 Am. JUR. 2D Forcible Entry and Detainer § 2 (1967).
37. Id.
38. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1077 n.50 (containing a comprehensive treatment of the
forcible entry and detainer statutes in the various jurisdictions). Arkansas is one of the jurisdic-
tions cited as retaining a criminal variation of the statute. This little used counterpart of the
forcible entry and detainer statute is found under the short title "Forcible Possession of Land"
and provides a penalty of fifty dollars and imprisonment for one year for taking possession of land
by force. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2051 (1977). See infra note 76 for the entire text of the statute.
39. See generally Comment, Landlord Eviction Remedies Act-Legislative Overreaction to
Landlord Self-Help, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 25, 29-31 (1982).
40. Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C.L. REv. 503,
510-11 (1982).
41. Id. at 510 (citing I H. TIFFANY. supra note 35, § 182 at 1147-54, 1156-67). The primary
obligation of the tenant is to pay rent. GLENDON, supra note 40, at 510.
42. Id. at 512-14, 523.
43. Id. at 539. For example, the reform recognizing the implied warranty of habitability
allows the tenant to assert affirmative defenses regarding the landlord's breach in the action insti-
tuted by the landlord to regain possession summarily. The lease is extended beyond the term
agreed upon during the resolution of these issues. This is true even though the Supreme Court of
the United States in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972), emphasized in upholding the consti-
tutionality of the forcible entry and detainer statutes of Oregon that "the Constitution does not
authorize us to require that the term of an otherwise expired tenancy be extended while the ten-
ant's damage claims against the landlord are litigated." 405 U.S. at 68.
44. 1813 Mo. Laws titled An Act to Prevent Forcible Entry and Detainer provides in rele-
vant part:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Territory of Missouri, That no person or
persons that hereafter make any entry into any lands, tenements or other possessions,
but in cases where entry is given by law, and in such case, not with strong hand, nor
with multitude of people, but only in a peaceable and easy manner: and if any person or
persons from henceforth, do to the contrary, he shall be taken and deemed to have
entered with force and strong hand, as is hereinafter provided, and it shall not be
deemed necessary for the complainant as herein after [sic] named to make any other
proof of the forcible entry and detainer with strong hand, or of the forcible detainer
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Territory of Arkansas.45 The first reported Arkansas Supreme Court
case interpreting the forcible entry and detainer statute, Thorn v.
Reed, 46 involved the question of whether title is in issue when a tenant
holds over after peaceful entry, and an unlawful detainer action is
brought by the landlord. The court examined the seventh clause of the
forcible entry and detainer statute47 and determined that two different
actions were embraced, "wholly distinct and independent of each
other" and "the remedy applied is essentially different. 48 The court
concluded that title could be brought into issue in forcible entry and
detainer actions, but not in unlawful detainer actions.' 9
only, than that he was lawfully possessed of the premises, and that the defendant un-
lawfully entered into or detained the same from him or them.
Act of Aug. 19, 1813, 1813 Mo. Acts 43. This version of the statute, as well as the 1839 version of
the statute in Arkansas provided a civil remedy and conferred jurisdiction on the justices of the
peace to hear such cases. See McGuire v. Cook, 13 Ark. 448 (1853). The Arkansas Supreme
Court, in McLain v. Taylor, 4 Ark. 147 (1842), rendered the 1839 version of the statute unconsti-
tutional because it conferred jurisdiction on the justices of the peace. An act was passed in 1845
reenacting much of the statute of 1839, but conferring jurisdiction on the circuit courts to deter-
mine these issues. See McGuire v. Cook, 13 Ark. 448 (1853) (reviewing the early development of
the statute in Arkansas).
45. See Thorn v. Reed, I Ark. 480 (1839) for a review of the early history of the statute in
Arkansas. The 1819 Arkansas Act provides in relevant part:
Sec. I. Be it enacted by the Governor and Judges of the territory of Arkansas, That all
the laws and parts of laws now in existence in the territory of Missouri, which are of a
public and general and not of a local nature, and which are not repugnant to the provi-
sions of the original law of this territory, or do not come within the purview of any law
passed at the present session of the Legislature of the territory of Arkansas, shall be
and continue in force as fully, and to the same extent so far as they are applicable ...
Act of Aug. 3, 1819, 1819 Ark. Acts 70.
46. I Ark. 480 (1839).
47. Id. at 494.
48. Id. at 494.
49. Id. at 494-95. The two actions should be considered as arising for distinct and separate
injuries, and the issues involved in unlawful detainer are not involved in forcible entry and de-
tainer. In Arkansas, as in many other states, the action of unlawful detainer is the summary
process used by the lessor to regain possession generally. The forcible entry and detainer proceed-
ing is for the protection of any party who has been disseised. See generally 3A G. THOMPSON,
supra note 31, § 1369.
An unlawful detainer action is brought under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1504 (Supp. 1985) which
provides:
Every person who shall willfully and without right hold over any lands, tenements or
possessions after the determination of the time for which they were demised or let to
him, or the person under whom he claims, or shall peaceably and lawfully obtain pos-
session of any such, and shall hold the same willfully and lawfully after demand made
in writing for the delivery or surrender of possession thereof by the person having the
right to such possession, his agent or attorney, or who shall fail or refuse to pay the rent
therefor when due, and after three (3) days notice to quit and demand made in writing
for the possession thereof by the person entitled thereto, his agent or attorney, shall
refuse to quit such possession, shall be deemed guilty of an unlawful detainer within the
UALR LAW JOURNAL
In the process of determining whether the plaintiff's complaint was
defective for failure to allege possession, the court in McGuire v.
Cook 50 explained that portion of the Thorn decision regarding whether
title is in issue in forcible entry and detainer actions.51 According to the
court in MeGuire, the holding in Thorn, that legal right or title to pos-
session must be shown by plaintiff to recover, was premised on the con-
struction given the English statutes, "excus[ing] the force where the
disseizor had the better right."'52 The court in McGuire found that the
1839 revision of the statute expressly provided that the merits of title
could not be inquired into in a forcible entry and detainer action." The
court stated that "the only question is, who was in possession and how
was that possession lost." '54
In Hall v. Trucks55 the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether an unlawful entry could supply the requisite force for
the maintenance of a forcible entry and detainer action. The court an-
swered in the negative after examining the words of the 1875 version of
the provision defining forcible entry and detainer." The court in Hall
found an absence of proof of forcible entry or subsequent holding with
force in this boundary dispute. 7
In Johnson v. West 58 the Arkansas Supreme Court again distin-
guished between unlawful detainer and forcible entry and detainer, and
the possession and force required for each action. On the issue of pos-
meaning of this Act.
50. 13 Ark. 448 (1853).
51. Id. at 453, 454-56.
52. Id. at 453.
53. Id. The court acknowledged that other states might be in disagreement about what con-
stitutes possession, but "the decisions are uniform that its only object is to restore possession
forcibly taken or unlawfully detained without regard to the ownership or title to the property." Id.
at 455-56.
54. Id. at 456. It was clear, in the court's view, that the plaintiff's failure to allege possession
was fatal. This did not mean that the party bringing suit was required to allege seisin, or even that
seisin would be sufficient to sustain the action, because something less than seisin, "bare possession
without right[,] will be protected and restored, if invaded by force, or held over by a tenant in
fraud of his contract." Id. at 459. Cf. Floyd v. Ricks, 14 Ark. 286 (1853) (an action in trespass
quare clausum fregit holding that a party with naked possession without right cannot maintain
trespass against the true owner for forcible entry).
55. 38 Ark. 257 (1881).
56. Id. at 260. The court provided little analysis in concluding that "unlawful" could not be
equated with "forcible," but indicated that the remedy "can only be resorted to in the case of a
forcible entry, or a turning out by force, or when the plaintiff parted with the possession under
some contract . . . express or implied, that the possession should be restored to him." Id. at 259.
57. Id. at 260.
58. 41 Ark. 535 (1883). The court examined previous relevant case law, emphasizing Mc-
Guire v. Cook, 13 Ark. 448 (1853). Id. at 539-40.
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session, the court reaffirmed that less than actual possession by the
landlord is sufficient in unlawful detainer because the action of unlaw-
ful detainer is founded on contract and designed to benefit landlords.59
The tenant is estopped from denying his landlord's title, whether the
landlord himself or his assignee asserts it. 0
According to the court in Johnson, forcible entry and detainer is,
by contrast, a tort remedy designed to protect actual possession
whether rightful or wrongful."1 "Force is the gist of the action."
62
Neither constructive possession nor implied force from an unlawful en-
try is sufficient to maintain the action.63
In Littell v. Grady 4 the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the
object of this statute is "to keep the peace; nor [sic] to determine rights
of property. It is to prevent any and all persons with or without title,
from assuming to right themselves with strong hand, after the feudal
fashion, when peaceable possession cannot be obtained."' 5 The statute
was not crucial to the resolution of the case because of the pleadings;66
however, the court reaffirmed earlier cases holding that title is not at
issue or adjudicated in forcible entry and detainer actions, rather only
possession is at issue.6
7
The Arkansas Supreme Court cited Littell in the subsequent case
of Vinson v. Flynn.66 Flynn's refusal to vacate the premises on notice
following the expiration of a lease prompted Vinson, his landlord, to
seek a writ of possession from a justice of the peace.69 After Vinson
59. Id. at 540-41.
60. Id. at 540.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The court concluded that since entry was on unenclosed lands, without weapons or
threats, and the taking of the dwelling was without actions likely to cause fear, there was not
sufficient force to maintain a forcible entry and detainer action. Id. at 541. Similarly, the subse-
quent refusal to vacate the house did not make the defendants guilty of a forcible detainer. Id. In
the court's view, the defendant's actions were of no more force than ordinary trespass. Id.
64. 38 Ark. 584 (1882).
65. Id. at 587.
66. The court acknowledged a unique history of pleading in the facts of Littell. When the
plaintiff sued Grady under the forcible entry and detainer statute, he was put into possession as
required. Littell answered, denying Grady's right to possession and his title. When Grady then
withdrew a demurrer to the cross-complaint and consented to have the case transferred to the
equity docket, this had the effect of changing the cause of action from forcible detainer to an
equitable suit to set aside a deed. Id. at 586-87.
67. Id. at 587.
68. 64 Ark. 453, 43 S.W. 146 (1897).
69. Id. at 455, 43 S.W. at 147. The writ issued after Vinson gave security as required. The
constable executed the writ, turning Flynn, his wife, their three children, and their belongings out
into the snow. Flynn's witnesses at trial testified that the belongings were damaged, and Vinson
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removed Flynn, Flynn successfully recovered damages and Vinson ap-
pealed. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed on various grounds, ad-
dressing primarily Flynn's award of punitive damages for the malicious
prosecution undertaken by Vinson in obtaining a defective writ of pos-
session.70 The court concluded that, on remand, the only damages Vin-
son would be liable for were those actually sustained if the landlord
"unnecessarily committed any injury to [the tenant's] person or
goods."' 7' The court remanded for a rehearing on whether actual dam-
ages were sustained, recognizing that the English statutes provided ex-
clusively for a criminal penalty and that no civil rights of the parties
were affected. 2
The court in Vinson acknowledged that the rule limiting the relief
to that provided by the statute also applies when the statutory proceed-
ing is civil in nature .7  The circuit court jury instruction authorizing
punitive damages was therefore in error, since the forcible entry and
detainer statute does not authorize such damages. 4
The result in Vinson should be contrasted with an earlier Arkansas
Supreme Court case, Winn v. State,75 which involved provisions of a
lease held to successfully confer a right of entry for conditions broken.
The landlord was charged and convicted under the criminal corollary to
forcible entry and detainer .7  The conviction was challenged on the
answered that there was no injury to the family or their goods. Id.
70. Id. at 459-60, 43 S.W. at 149. The court alluded that the lack of clarity in the record
regarding the theory of recovery at the trial level resulted in a need to speculate about why the
trial court reached the result it did. Id. at 460, 43 S.W. at 149. After concluding that the plain-
tifts theory must have been based on malicious prosecution, the court acknowledged a split of
authority and declined to follow those jurisdictions sustaining an action for malicious prosecution
based on a lack of jurisdiction of the justice of the peace issuing the writs. The result of finding
that jurisdiction was not proper was to place Vinson in the same position that he would have been
in if he had taken possession without a writ. Id. at 461, 43 S.W. at 149.
71. Id. at 461, 43 S.W. at 149.
72. Id. at 458-59, 43 S.W. at 148. The court cited Jackson v. Farmer, 9 Wend. 201 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1832), wherein it was stated:
It was the abuse of this summary power to right one's self by entry, where the right of
entry existed, which gave rise to the numerous English statutes against forcible entry
and detainer. . . and in these Acts, and the common law remedy by indictment, are to
be found the only protection of the property thus forcibly dispossessed. They punish
criminally the force, and in some cases make restitution to the possession.
64 Ark. at 459, 43 S.W. at 148.
73. 64 Ark. at 459, 43 S.W. at 148.
74. Id. at 459, 43 S.W. at 149.
75. 55 Ark. 360, 18 S.W. 375 (1892).
76. Id. at 361-62, 18 S.W. at 375. The prosecution was brought under the predecessor to
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2051 (1977), which provides:
Every person who shall take, or keep possession of any real estate by actual force or
violence, without the authority of law, or who being armed with a deadly or dangerous
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ground that the trial court erroneously excluded testimony on the ten-
ant's breach of lease provisions.7
The Arkansas Supreme Court held that stipulations contained in
the lease were conditions, the breach of which, if proven, entitled the
landlord to enter8.7  The court stated that "[the landlord] was entitled
to re-enter for condition broken, though not to use force to effect the
reentry," and that "if he had the lawful right to possession peaceably
acquired, he had the right to protect his possession by force, if neces-
sary. . "..,79 The decision in Winn has been cited as following the
weight of authority.80 The court's holding is consistent with other cases
decided around the end of the nineteenth century.8"
In Towell v. Etter,82 a later case addressing the issue of whether
accretions are included in a tax sale, the court referred to Winn. The
court stated that the landholder might "defend his possession by force,
if necessary, and if he do[es] so he will not be guilty of forcible entry
and detainer" provided that he has title and right to possession and
gains possession peacefully. 8
Miller v. Plummer84 is another boundary dispute case decided
during the early twentieth century. The Arkansas Supreme Court af-
firmed the holding of Towell and stated that actual force had been
weapon, shall by violence to any person entitled to the possession, or by putting in fear
of immediate danger to his person, obtain or keep possession of any such real estate or
property, without legal authority, shall on conviction be adjudged guilty of a misde-
meanor, and be fined not less than fifty dollars [$50.00], and be imprisoned not exceed-
ing [I] year.
77. 55 Ark. at 363, 18 S.W. at 375 (1892).
78. Id. at 365, 18 S.W. at 375. The lease stated that if the lessees "failed to comply with any
of its stipulations, they hereby agree to forfeit said lease." Id. at 364, 18 S.W. at 375. One month
after serving notice of the breach, the landlord entered the land in the absence of the tenants, who
were subsequently prevented from coming onto the land by threats from the armed landlord. The
jury found Winn guilty of holding by force, as charged in the indictment, and convicted him. Id.
at 363, 18 S.W. at 375.
79. Id. at 364, 18 S.W. at 376. The court approvingly quoted from another jurisdiction the
following: "'if one have the right to enter and take possession of premises in the occupancy of
another, his entry will be legal and not contrary to the statute concerning forcible entry and
detainer, if made while the other party is temporarily absent from the premises, leaving no one
there.'" Id. at 364-65, 18 S.W. at 376 (quoting from Mussey v. Scott, 32 Vt. 82 (1859)). The
nonperformance of the conditions, if substantiated, would confer on the landlord a right to enter
peacefully.
80. Annotation, Right of Landlord Legally Entitled to Possession to Dispossess Tenant
Without Legal Process, 6 A.L.R. 3D 177, 198 (1966).
81. Id. at 194-98.
82. 69 Ark. 38, 63 S.W. 53 (1901).
83. Id. at 40, 63 S.W. at 55.
84. 105 Ark. 630, 152 S.W. 288 (1912).
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required in all the decisions of the court.85 The court further stated
that "in the absence of it the action cannot be maintained. ' *
The force element was further refined and objectively defined in
Douglas v. Lamb,8 7 in which the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that
the terms "actual force" did not mean "[aictual physical violence upon
the person in possession by the one who takes possession . . . but 'if the
demonstration of the force is such as to create a reasonable apprehen-
sion that the party in possession must yield to avoid a breach of the
peace, it is sufficient.' "88
Again, in Black v. Handley89 the crucial question as perceived by
the court was whether the defendant had used force in obtaining pos-
session. The court held that when the defendant entered by unfastening
the door, in the absence of the plaintiff who is still in possession, there
is sufficient force.9°
Twenty years later, the Arkansas Supreme court in Wall v.
Roblinge1 continued to focus on the issue of force. The court affirmed
the trial court's refusal to consider the defendant's claim of superior
title, and found sufficient force in the defendant's acts of cutting a
fence and running cattle onto the land to maintain the action. 92 There
have not been any significant cases in this area in Arkansas since Wall.
To assess the development of Arkansas forcible entry and detainer,
it is helpful to note the development of the statutes in other jurisdic-
tions after the early nineteenth century. There are three approaches to
the amount of force that landlords may use to recover possession under
forcible entry and detainer statutes.93 The English rule allows the use
of necessary and reasonable force without resort to judicial process. 94
During the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, this ap-
proach was followed by approximately one-third of the jurisdictions.9 5
The decision in Winn placed Arkansas in the second category,
85. Id. at 637, 152 S.W. at 291.
86. Id. at 634, 152 S.W. at 290 (citing Towell v. Etter, 69 Ark. 34 (1900); Johnson v. West,
41 Ark. 535 (1883); Littell v. Grady, 38 Ark. 587 (1882); Hall v. Trucks, 38 Ark. 257 (1881);
Dortch v. Robinson, 31 Ark. 296 (1876); McGuire v. Cook, 13 Ark. 448 (1853)).
87. 157 Ark. I1, 247 S.W. 77 (1923).
88. Id. at 14-15, 247 S.W. at 78 (quoting II R.C.L. § 23 at 1160-61).
89. 240 S.W. 411 (1922) (unreported opinion, 158 Ark. 640).
90. 240 S.W. at 413.
91. 207 Ark. 987, 183 S.W.2d 605 (1944).
92. Id. at 989, 183 S.W.2d at 605-06.
93. See generally Annotation, supra note 80, at 182-89. See also Comment, supra note 39,
at 28-3 1.
94. Annotation, supra note 80, at 182.
95. Id. at 183.
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which allows the landlord to enter peacefully and dispossess; however,
once force becomes necessary, the landlord must resort to judicial pro-
cess. "6 The landlord in Winn was entitled to use force to hold the prem-
ises subsequet," to a peaceful entry. 7
The modern trend and growing majority forbids the use of meth-
ods other than judicial process, citing a policy of preventing breaches of
the peace as support for this approach.98
In Gorman v. Ratliff," the Arkansas Supreme Court held that
provisions of a lease authorizing landlord self-help are invalid. The
court emphasized the clear intent of the legislature, as evidenced in the
repeal and reenactment of the forcible entry and detainer statute in
Act 615 of 1981, was to provide additional protection to the party in
possession by giving him notice and an opportunity to be heard. 100 This
revision of the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute also protected land-
lords by providing an expeditious judicial method for removal of parties
unlawfully in possession. 10 1 The court noted that Act 615 did not ex-
pressly give landlords a right of entry except by first resorting to legal
process.102
The court found that the public policy of protecting the party in
possession, which underlies the Forcible Entry and Detainer scheme, is
reinforced by the history of the statute.103 The court cited Vinson v.
Flynn as authority for the proposition that the longstanding policy be-
hind forcible entry and detainer statutes is to prevent the landlord from
taking land by force.104
The court further emphasized that statutes requiring adjudication
of possession place the weak and strong on equal terms, citing Littell v.
Grady.105 The court acknowledged a growing trend in the direction of
requiring a landlord, entitled to possession, to resort to the remedy
given by law. 1" The modern trend forbids the use of methods other
96. Annotation, supra note 80, at 189.
97. 55 Ark. at 364, 18 S.W. at 376.
98. Annotation, supra note 80, at 186.
99. 289 Ark. 332, 337, 712 S.W.2d 888, 889 (1986).
100. Id. at 335-36, 712 S.W.2d at 889. Under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1507 (Supp. 1985), if
the defendant responds to the notice of complaint and intention to issue a writ of possession within
five days, he will be given a hearing. If the defendant fails to respond, the writ of possession is
issued.
101. 289 Ark. at 335-36, 712 S.W.2d at 889.
102. Id. at 337, 712 S.W.2d at 890.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citing Vinson v. Flynn, 64 Ark. 453, 43 S.W. 146 (1897)).
105. Id. (citing Littell v. Grady, 38 Ark. 584, 587 (1882)).
106. Id. (citing Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal. 2d 597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20 (1961);
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than judicial process. 107 The court cited a policy of preventing breaches
of the peace as support for this approach. 8 The court in Gorman
adopted the modern trend and stated that the "action is designed to
compel the party out of actual possession to respect the present posses-
sion of the other party and resort to legal channels to obtain
possession." 0 9
The court did not find persuasive the landlord's position that one
section of the statute in particular should be read to prohibit only ac-
tions taken "'without right or claim to title. .. .' "110 The court
adopted the tenant's position that a person engaging in any one of the
activities listed in title 34, section 1503 of the Arkansas Statutes Anno-
tated undertakes prohibited activity within the meaning of the Act."'
The court refused to find that isolated portions of the statute or the
entire statute could be waived by contractual agreement." 2
Justice Newburn, in his concurrence, said he would frame the is-
sue so that a much narrower ground could be used to reach the same
result. In his opinion, the issue should be framed "whether a lessee, by
a provision in a lease contract, may confer upon the lessor the 'right' to
enter which, according to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1503 (Supp. 1985), ex-
empts the landlord from liability. ... "I' Justice Newburn would sim-
ply invalidate a contract that seeks to avoid the strong public policy
against forcible entry.
The opinion in Gorman emphasized that Act 615 reflects a public
policy favoring invalidation of lease provisions that authorize a landlord
Flora v. Parker, 205 So. 2d 363 (Fla. App. 1968); Bass v. Boetel & Co., 191 Neb. 733, 217
N.W.2d 804 (1974); Edwards v. C.N. Investment Co., 27 Ohio Misc. 57, 272 N.E.2d 652
(1971)).
107. See generally 35 Am. JUR. 2D Forcible Entry & Detainer § 5, at 894 (1967).
108. 289 Ark. at 337, 712 S.W.2d at 890.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 336, 712 S.W.2d at 890. The court quoted ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1503 (Supp.
1985) which provides:
If any person shall enter into or upon any lands, tenaments or other possessions and
detain or hold the same without right or claim to title, or who shall enter by breaking
open the doors and windows or other parts of the house, whether any person be in or
not, or by threatening to kill, maim or beat the party in possession or by such words
and actions as have a natural tendency to excite fear or apprehension of danger or by
putting out of doors or by carrying away the goods of the party in possession, or by
entering peaceably and then turning out by force or frightening by threats or other
circumstances of terror the party to yield possession, in such cases every person so of-
fending shall be deemed to be guilty of a forcible entry and detainer within the mean-
ing of this Act.
III. 289 Ark. at 336, 712 S.W.2d at 890.
112. Id. at 338, 712 S.W.2d at 891.
113. Id. at 339, 712 S.W.2d at 891 (Newburn, J., concurring).
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to enter and take personal belongings absent resort to lawful process."'
On a broader level, the court concluded that since the Act does not give
the landlord the right to enter until he has resorted to legal process,
self-help action is prohibited. 1 5 The probable effect of this decision is
to invalidate any attempt by landlords to circumvent the statute. Even
in the absence of forceful entry, in padlocking for example, it is likely
that the court would extend the reasoning of Gorman to reach such a
situation; the emphasis is no longer on force.
The court in Gorman did not address squarely the question of
whether force was used by the landlord. The action historically has re-
quired in Arkansas that the plaintiff allege and prove that the defend-
ant acted with force. The court could have disposed of the element of
force in Gorman by ruling that the act undertaken was disallowed as a
specific act of forcible entry and detainer, and therefore the force ele-
ment was satisfied. The court went beyond this and broadly prohibited
landlord self-help. The question left open by the case is whether the
court will consistently follow its progressive departure from outdated
case law in cases not involving a specifically prohibited act.
The majority opinion also relied on Act 615, which added a due
process notice requirement and an additional procedural hearing to
prohibit landlord self-help. 1 The court's interpretation of legislative
intent is consistent with the modern trend which clearly favors protect-
ing the party in possession, even absent force.
Landlords in Arkansas are faced with delinquent tenants every
month. Prior to Gorman, landlords also faced the uncertainty of using
self-help remedies. The court has resolved the uncertainties faced by
both landlords and tenants by acknowledging legislative support for a
policy against landlord self-help. Attorneys drafting leases in the future
are forewarned that provisions granting extra-judicial remedies will be
invalidated if those remedies contravene the statute. A landlord could
be subjected to damages for exercising contractual "rights" if he vio-
lates the act. Conceivably, criminal penalties could be assessed under
the infrequently used forcible possession of land statute in a proper
case, 117 and it seems unlikely that the decision in Gorman would affect
the requirement of force in the criminal context.
Existing concurrently with the statutory protections for tenants,
the landlord has a clearly delineated civil method for judicial removal
114. Id. at 336-37, 712 S.W.2d at 889-90.
115. Id. at 337-38, 712 S.W.2d at 890-91.
116. Id. at 335-36, 712 S.W.2d at 889.
117. ARK. STAT, ANN. § 41-2051 (1977). See also supra note 76.
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of holdover tenants." 8 The landlord also has a judicial procedure to
prosecute tenants holding over after a ten day notice. 119 The criminal
prosecution results in a misdemeanor for holding over after a ten day
notice to vacate. 2' A landlord who prevails under the damages provi-
sion of the forcible entry and detainer statute is entitled to fair rental
value and liquidated damages (three times the monthly rental value in
commercial realty). 12 1 Either method will be likely to serve the land-
lord's ends of encouraging delinquent tenants to vacate or pay the rent
to avoid the threatened judicial procedure.
The forcible entry and detainer statute, rooted in antiquity, has
been brought into the twentieth century by the Arkansas Supreme
Court in Gorman. The court strikes a welcome balance between socie-
tal interests in avoiding breaches of the peace and the private property
interests of landlords. 2 ' The holding is narrow in scope and does not
affect the disparate treatment of Arkansas tenants in other contexts,
but hopefully signals that change in this area is forthcoming.
Rene Sims Dale
118. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1504 (1981). See also supra note 49.
.10 AN". § Cn* ~tl~A t-
• n19. ARK. STAT. r(,. ,-aa (-,,,,. Auruing to the National Housing Law Project,
this criminal eviction statute distinguishes Arkansas as the only state retaining a criminal eviction
statute in the United States. Letter from Frances E. Werner to Don Hollingsworth (Mar. 6,
1987). Prior to Williams v. City of Pine Bluff, 284 Ark. 551, 683 S.W.2d 923 (1985), it was
thought that the criminal trespass statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2004 (1977), would also provide
criminal penalties for the benefit of the landlord attempting to evict, but the Arkansas Supreme
Court analyzed the current landlord/tenant statutory scheme and concluded that the unlawful
detainer statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1504 (Supp. 1985) and the "Failure to Pay Rent-Refusal
to Vacate Upon Notice" statute, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-523 (1971), historically have governed the
landlord/tenant relationship. The court concluded that application of the criminal trespass statute
to this relationship would not reflect past legislative treatment of the relationship. 284 Ark. at 555,
683 S.W.2d at 925-26. The court further noted that the fact that the forcible entry and detainer
statute has not been challenged since 1875 is persuasive of its validity. 284 Ark. at 555, 683
S.W.2d at 925-26.
120. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 50-523 (1971).
121. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1509 (Supp. 1985).
122. The decision in Gorman is in line with the suggested approach of one author on this
topic:
[The emancipation] of the Forcible Entry and Detainer law from archaic common law
categories is accomplished only when forcible entry and detainer protection focuses not
on "possession" but on protecting people, such that protection of the public peace is
favored over protecting property rights, except where imminent danger to property
rights cannot be otherwise mitigated.
Comment, supra note 7, at 1094 (discussing the problems between owners and "squatters" in
England with reference to a trend in the United States).
